Silence Is Endorsement: Verification-Status Laundering in LLM Agent Pipelines
The safety check in most agent systems reads a summary, not the original evidence — so when a planner's note that an action is authorized, unverified passes through a summarizer and a memory compressor, the claim survives and the caveat does not. Holding the action and the authorization wording fixed and removing only the unverified framing raised one monitor's approval of risky actions from 5% to 60% and another's from 9% to 98%, and a full proposer-summarizer-memory-monitor chain reached 57% to 81% risky approval across three downstream monitors; memory compression alone dropped the marker in 60% to 100% of items depending on which model compressed. Instructing the monitor to reject unverified authorization is not a reliable patch — two models stopped being fooled, one got worse, and one began refusing legitimate requests. Carry authorization as structured state attached to the specific claim and have the gate read that field, instead of trusting a caveat that later stages are free to paraphrase away.